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Abstract
Several developments in the measurement of justice have drawn on Amartya
Sen’s work on capabilities. This article addresses the relationship between
Sen’s theoretical work and its interpretation in the measurement of justice,
in particular by the United Nations Development Project (UNDP) and by the
British Equality and Human Rights Commission and Government Equalities
Office in its Equality Measurement Framework. It starts with a review of the
diverse interpretations of Sen’s work, which range from considering it to be an
innovative radical development to locating his work within the liberal tradi-
tion. Central to the article is the question of whether it is possible to develop a
meaningful operationalization of Sen’s philosophical distinctions, in particu-
lar that between capabilities and functionings, so as to inform measurement
frameworks. It finds that on both conceptual andmethodological grounds it is
not possible to sustain this distinction in practice. This is illustrated by an anal-
ysis of the changing measurement of justice in frameworks developed by the
UNDP and the UK government. Changes in the content of the measurement
frameworks in radical or neoliberal directions are not constrained by Sen’s
theoretical analysis, despite claims that Sen’s work informs these frameworks.
The openness of Sen’s work means that it can be used by forces generated by
the neoliberal environment to support their redefinition of justice.
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THE WORK of Amartya Sen has become much cited in both philo-sophical and practical analyses of justice (Human Development andCapability Association, 2011; Sen, 1977, 1981, 1984, 1992, 1999,
2004, 2009). Sen’s work has become an important and influential part of
the deliberative argumentation over the meaning of justice, both as a philo-
sophical idea and the development of ways to accurately describe it
(Nussbaum, 2000, 2003). Measuring justice is an important part of the
development of policies and politics so as to ascertain what effects they are
having. However, there are competing frameworks to inform this process
of constructing measures of justice, including equality, equality of opportu-
nity and human rights, which derive from social democratic as well as lib-
eral traditions (Arneson, 1989; Jewson and Mason, 1986; Korpi and Palme,
1998; Rawls, 1978;Walby, 2009;Wilkinson and Pickett, 2009).
Sen’s work is open to multiple readings and varied interpretations have
developed (Fukuda-Parr, 2003; Robeyns, 2003). It is not uncommon for con-
cepts to be stretched, but how far this can occur while retaining their mean-
ing is an issue (Lombardo et al., 2009). Sen’s early work underpinned the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) challenge to interna-
tional governmental assumptions that economic growth was the pre-eminent
indicator of progress and its argument for replacing the goal of ‘economic
development’ by ‘human development’ (UNDP, 1990). But recent interpreta-
tions of Sen (Alkire, 2005; Human Development and Capability
Association, 2011) have focused on the elements of choice and opportunity
within his concept of capabilities. This divergence in interpretation of Sen’s
work includes the contrasting prioritization of ‘just outcomes’ as compared
with ‘choice and opportunity’.
There are several attempts to translate Sen’s rather philosophical texts
into quantitative indicators to measure progress in the real world. This pro-
cess of operationalization of concepts into forms of measurement has pro-
ceeded in quite varied directions across diverse projects and different
times (Alkire et al., 2009; Fukuda-Parr, 2003; UNDP, 1990). Two major
attempts to develop frameworks for measuring justice that have claimed
Sen as their authority and inspiration are those of the UNDP and the
British Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) and
Government Equalities Office (GEO) Equality Measurement Framework
(EMF).The UNDP project has, since 1990, challenged the notion that prog-
ress equates to economic growth, producing an ever-changing suite of indi-
cators of human rather than merely economic development (UNDP, 1990,
2009). This perspective has contributed to the development of the UN
Millennium Development Goals (2000), which also include human develop-
ment alongside economic development. The EHRC and GEO, since their
foundation in 2007, have sought to develop a framework to measure equali-
ties for a three-yearly review (EHRC, 2010). The EHRC, formed from the
merger of earlier equality commissions, derives its existence not only from
UK law but also from a world-leading European Union-wide (EU) set of
Directives and Treaties on equalities (Europa, 2011).
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Central to Sen’s theory of justice is the concept of ‘capabilities’ and its
distinction from the concept of ‘functionings’. One of the challenges in inter-
preting the implications of Sen’s writings for the real world is to find an
empirical distinction that maps onto his philosophical distinction between
‘capabilities’ and ‘functionings’. Can this challenge be met and a methodology
be found to operationalize his philosophical concepts in a way that can be
utilized in frameworks to measure justice? Or is Sen’s work so open that it
can be drawn upon to support widely varying measures of justice, rather
than something that is distinctive and robust? Is Sen’s work, despite its
global icon status, merely an open signifier, which can be filled with an
almost never-ending diversity of interpretations? If so, does this make
Sen’s work vulnerable to adoption in support of neoliberal forces?
This article reconsiders the interpretations and implications of the
work of Amartya Sen in theoretical and practical contexts. It reviews and
clarifies the range of meaning of Sen’s concepts in their philosophical and
economic contexts. It reviews the development of justice frameworks in the
UNDP and the British EHRC/GEO’s EMF. It analyses the selection of
the topics and the indicators used to measure progress by the UNDP and
the various approaches to the EHRC’s EMF. It compares these with alterna-
tive traditions and proposals to approach equality and justice, and considers
whether the use of Sen’s capabilities approach makes any difference to the
measurement of justice, fairness, equality and progress.
Tensions in the Writings of Amartya Sen
There are many competing conceptions of justice, fairness and progress.
Sen’s work has been variously positioned in relation to these. Initially this
raises the question as to whether there is a ‘real’ Sen underlying these or
whether there are merely many differences in interpretations. There is an
issue as to whether Sen has changed, whether his interpreters have changed,
or whether these multiple themes have always been co-present in his work.
There is a tension in Sen’s work as well as in its interpretations as to
whether it is radical or merely traditional Western individualist liberalism
(Gore, 1997). A radical view might focus on his early work on famine,
which he analysed as the result of poverty and inequalities rather than short-
age of food (Sen, 1981, 1984), and his focus on longevity rather than
income in the Human Development Index (HDI); while traditional liberal-
ism might be seen in his philosophical preferences for choice and freedom
over other values, including democracy (Gasper and van Staveren, 2003).
An alternative approach is to see his theoretical writing as traditionally lib-
eral, but that his practical interpreters have used his work to support more
radical projects. In this view it is the UNDP that interprets him as radical,
despite, rather than because of his writings. At the same time his concepts
may be seen as open to less progressive practice, for example supporting
the concept of empowerment, that some see as supporting a neoliberal ero-
sion of an emancipatory project (Sardenberg, 2008). There is a question as
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to whether it is more appropriate to see both his work and his interpreters
changing over time and in different contexts. For example, as the political
environment has changed over time, the UNDP has developed greater inter-
est in indicators on gender and on choice and agency (Fukuda-Parr, 2003).
Sen is an economist and a philosopher. He rejects approaches to jus-
tice based on the economists’ focus on income and resources, as well as the
utilitarian focus pioneered by Bentham on individual happiness or utility,
in favour of his own focus on a person’s freedom to have the capability to
do and be the things they have reason to value (Sen, 2009: 231). Sen’s capa-
bility approach is presented as underpinning the conceptual framework for
the Human Development Reports of the UNDP, offering an alternative to
a sole focus on economic growth (Fukuda-Parr, 2003). This framework was
first established in 1990 with the HDI, which included longevity and educa-
tion alongside income per person in a composite indicator, and has been
steadily developed since.
Sen (2009) draws on and modifies traditionalWestern concepts of jus-
tice as fairness, freedom and choice. He retains some aspects of liberal
thought, while in other respects he attempts to go beyond it. Sen stays
close to the central tenets of Western individualism and (neo)liberalism by
treating individual choice as if it were more fundamental than other
values. It is especially the focus on the concept of ‘choice’ that opens his
work to a neoliberal interpretation and deployment (discussed further
below).
However, while Sen stays within some aspects of theWestern, individ-
ual, liberal tradition, he rejects some of its variants, such as a focus on eco-
nomic growth (Alkire and Black, 1997). Sen draws on and departs from
Rawls (1978), especially by utilizing a comparative method to the analysis
of injustice rather than utilizing more universalistic conceptions. His
notion of freedom (Sen, 1999) is a substantive one, defined as what people
can actually do and be. Sen thus uses the concept of positive freedom or pos-
itive liberty as opposed to negative liberty (Berlin, 1969), that is, freedom
to rather than freedom from, originally based on the ideas of Kant. Where
the former is more frequently associated with social democratic or socialist
interpretations of freedom, social groups or members of social groups and
the tradition of Marx and Hegel (e.g. Taylor, 1979), the latter is more often
associated with a neoliberal interpretation of freedom, individual agents
and the tradition of Spencer and Mill (Hayek, 1960; Nozick, 1974). In some
of his early work, Sen (1984) even more clearly departs from liberal ortho-
doxy, such as in his work on famine. His analysis of famine was a trenchant
critique of the policies that led to thousands of people dying of starvation,
arguing that it was a shortage of money to buy food not a shortage of food
itself that led to such needless hardship and death. Starvation, Sen (1981)
argued, is the result of inequalities in the mechanisms of food distribution.
Sen wishes to go beyond money as an end in itself, to valuing human life,
and takes as his route to this the path of capabilities, opportunities and
choice.
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Capabilities and Functionings
Central to the innovations in Sen’s philosophical writing is the distinction
between ‘capabilities’ and ‘functionings’. In Sen’s distinction between capabil-
ity and functioning, functioning is defined as the achievement or outcome,
while capability is the capacity to achieve such functioning. A capability is
an opportunity or a freedom; it is the ability to choose. A functioning is
an outcome or achievement.
Individual advantage is judged in the capability approach by a person’s capa-
bility to do things he or she has reasons to value. . . . The focus here is on
the freedom that a person actually has to do this or be that ^ things that
he or she may value doing or being. (Sen, 2009: 231^2)
A key issue in engagement with Sen is the priority he gives to capabil-
ities over functionings in his approach to justice. Sen prefers to focus his
analysis of justice on capabilities rather than on functionings.
In the nature of human lives, we have reason to be interested not only in the
various things we succeed in doing, but also in the freedoms that we actually
have to choose between different kinds of lives. The freedom to choose our
lives can make a significant contribution to our well-being, but going
beyond the perspective of well-being, the freedom itself may be seen as
important. (Sen, 2009: 18)
In this way, Sen prioritizes opportunity, freedom and choice over equality of
outcomes. In his account of justice, the ability of an individual to choose is
prioritized above other values.
Various problems have been identified in relation to Sen’s preference
for capabilities rather than functionings as the basis of justice. Since choices
and preferences are shaped by circumstances, which are likely to be affected
by power and inequality, those in disadvantaged circumstances are likely to
adapt their preferences to what is likely to be possible (Qizilbash, 1997).
Further, as Sen (1977) himself has pointed out, an individual cannot know
their future preferences or interests and hence any ‘choice’ made is already
made on their past preferences. As a consequence the preferences of the
poor are likely to be more limited in ambition than the preferences of the
rich (Sen, 1984: 309). Sen himself notes the problem of ‘adaptive prefer-
ences’, but does not offer a satisfactory solution.
Sen discusses the practice of not-eating in order to argue that this
activity can involve freedom of choice if it is a culturally valued ‘fast’, even
though in other instances it can involve a lack of freedom as a consequence
of famine. He uses this example to argue for the importance of the capabil-
ity of choice, not merely the function of eating.
A person who voluntarily fasts, for political or religious reasons, may be
just as deprived of food and nourishment as a famine-stricken victim.
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Their manifest under-nutrition ^ their achieved functioning ^ may be much
the same, and yet the capability of the well-off person who chooses to fast
may be much larger than that of the person who starves involuntarily
because of poverty and destitution. (Sen, 2009: 237)
Yet this is a poor example. It is far from clear that there is equivalence
between the ‘under-nutrition’ of affluent people who fast for a few days and
those who are hungry because of famine. The outcome or functioning at
stake is good health, which the affluent person who fasts possesses but
which the poor victim of famine does not.
Sen’s focus on choice means that the capabilities concept is part of a
liberal approach to justice (Dean, 2009). This approach underestimates the
significance of the social construction of choice. The notion of choice is a
social invention and its experience is socially constructed. Most often,
choice is merely the perception of choice. Indeed, choice is becoming a
duty of individuals in complex fast-changing neoliberal social worlds
(Bauman, 2005; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991). Hence, a focus on choice as
the centre of human value becomes merely a circular route, reproducing
existing social relations and hierarchies. People choose what they can; they
choose what exists. ‘Choice’ and the associated suite of concepts such as ‘free-
dom’ are part of the reproduction of existing hierarchies, not part of a chal-
lenge to them. The promotion of the associated concept of agency in the
social sciences is part of their incorporation into the neoliberal orthodoxy.
Challenges in the Definition of Capabilities in Practice
The many options available for the production of a list of ‘capabilities’ has
led to much debate about the practical implications of Sen’s work. The
issues include: identifying the most important capabilities; mapping the
philosophical distinction between capabilities and functionings onto a dis-
tinction between empirical categories; evaluating potentially incommensura-
ble categories. These issues are addressed through a detailed discussion
of the development of the justice projects of the UNDP and British
EHRC/GEO.
Sen himself does not produce a list of capabilities. Indeed, he thinks
that the capability approach intrinsically cannot do so: ‘The capability per-
spective does point to the central relevance of the inequality of capabilities
in the assessment of social disparities, but it does not, on its own, propose
any specific formula for policy decisions’ (Sen, 2009: 232).
By contrast, Nussbaum (2000, 2003), integrating a more Aristotelian
philosophical heritage, offers a closed list, albeit one that remains at a
high level of abstraction. Her ten most important topics are: life and not
dying prematurely; bodily health, including good health, reproductive
health and shelter; bodily integrity, freedom to be mobile, secure from vio-
lent assault such as domestic violence, and opportunities for sexual satisfac-
tion; able to use the senses, imagination and thought in a way informed
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and cultivated by education, freedom of expression and religion; being able
to have emotional attachments; being able to engage in practical reason and
reflection; ability to affiliate with others, receive respect, whatever race or
sex; live with other species successfully; ability to play; and the ability to
participate politically, to hold property, decent employment.
The contrast in approach between Sen and Nussbaum may be under-
stood as a difference over whether justice claims are articulated in an
abstract deontological Kantian manner, or if they are more substantively
defined in an Aristotelian manner (Alston, 1988; Howarth, 1995). Sen
(2004: 77) insists that there should not be ‘one predetermined canonical list
of capabilities’. He considers that ‘such a fixed list, emanating entirely from
pure theory, is to deny the possibility of fruitful public participation on
what should be included and why’. Hence he seeks to retain the concept of
capabilities at a high level of abstraction, or at a deontological level.
Nussbaum (2000, 2003), by contrast, is eager to develop a practical list of
capabilities by drawing on philosophy as well as on multiple contributions
from social groups in dialogue. Nussbaum’s approach still needs to address
the determination of the criteria by which some capabilities are selected
rather than others.
Sen’s refusal to produce a list does not mean that his name is not
invoked to support particular lists. Indeed his personal authority is claimed
in support of the UNDP indicators of human development (Fukuda-Parr,
2003; UNDP, 1990), as well for the EHRC indicators of equality (Alkire
et al., 2009). It remains a question, however, as to whether it is appropriate
to state that Sen’s capabilities approach is the basis of any specific list,
since Sen himself states that it cannot be.
Problems arise in the attempt to translate Sen’s philosophical distinc-
tion between capabilities and functionings into a distinction between empir-
ically verifiable categories. Identifying what people would choose if they
were truly free to choose has proved an insurmountable difficulty.This dif-
ficulty is both conceptual and methodological simultaneously.
Conceptually, it is intrinsically difficult to determine what people’s prefer-
ences and choices are outside of what people have chosen. This is also a
methodological problem, in that it is almost impossible to discover prefer-
ences separately from what people do. Indeed, Sen (1992: 52) acknowledges
that there is a problem here. In a context in which it is hard to ascertain
what women and men would choose if they were not constrained, the only
reasonable basis for measuring capabilities offered in practice by the
UNDP and EHRC is that of achieved functionings or outcomes. This prob-
lem is noted by Robeyns: ‘We do not know what men and women would
choose if they were liberated from their gender roles and thus genuinely
free to choose’ (2003 86). ‘Given that we have little direct information
about people’s capability levels, we could start by taking group inequality
in achieved functionings as indicative of inequalities in capabilities’
(2003: 85). If it is empirically impossible to distinguish between capabilities
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and functionings, the value of the philosophical distinction for the measure-
ment of justice is thereby diminished.
Sen suggests that it is not possible to compare and evaluate capabili-
ties using a single standard and measure. However, he has a caveat in that
while, on the one hand, he states that capabilities are incommensurable, on
the other he says that it is possible to make reasoned evaluations between
them. Sen writes that ‘Capabilities are clearly non-commensurable since
they are irreducibly diverse’ (2009: 240) and that ‘we cannot reduce all the
things we have reason to value into one homogenous magnitude’ (2009:
239). But simultaneously he holds that ‘the choice and the weighting may
sometimes be difficult, but there is no general impossibility here of
making reasoned choices over combinations of diverse objects’ (2009: 241).
He suggests the way forward is through speaking ‘prose’; by implication
this is not a quantitative form of expression. Indeed Sen goes on to suggest
that it is possible to avoid ‘either/or’ thinking and to replace it by ‘both/
and’. However, while this way of thinking may make sense in some kinds
of philosophical writing, or poetry, it is not helpful if the task at hand is to
decide on a specific list of capabilities and whether these capabilities are
equally distributed or not. The use of a qualitative rather than quantitative
methodology, recommended by Zimmermann (2006), does not solve this
problem of the need to make a selection of capabilities and to find out
their pattern of distribution.
This raises the question of whether those who invoke Sen’s authority
follow his rejection of ‘one homogenous magnitude’. The UNDP’s central
index, the HDI, is a single number, composited from information about lon-
gevity, education and income (1990, 2009). Hence the UNDP does not
follow Sen’s position on this issue. The EHRC is also seeking quantitative
indicators that simplify the data about a range of diverse capabilities so as
to permit comparisons (Alkire et al., 2009).
Sen and the UNDP
The UNDP declares that Sen’s work underpins its own. Fukuda-Parr,
Director of the Human Development Report (HDR) Office, 1995^2006,
states: ‘Amartya Sen’s ideas constitute the core principles of a development
approach that has evolved in the Human Development Reports’ (2003:
301). ‘The Human Development Reports (HDRs), published annually for
UNDP since 1990, have used Amartya Sen’s capability approach as a con-
ceptual framework in their analyses of contemporary development chal-
lenges’ (2003: 301). Yet there is a caveat in that the framework is declared
to be ‘flexible’. ‘Sen’s ideas provide the core principles of a development
approach whose flexible framework allows policy-makers to analyze diverse
challenges that poor people and poor countries face, rather than imposing
a rigid orthodoxy with a set of policy prescriptions’ (2003: 302). This raises
the question as to the point at which this ‘flexibility’ becomes so great that
there is little significant connection between Sen’s ideas and the practical
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policy outcome. The argument here is that this flexibility is stretched
too far.
The most important contribution of the UNDP has been the HDI, a
composite formed from longevity, education (literacy and educational enrol-
ment) and income. The HDI has played an important role as an alternative
goal for global public policy to that of economic growth; one which includes
human, not only economic aspects.
Not only does the UNDP claim that its approach is in general
informed by Sen, but also that Sen was central to the development of the
list of key issues proposed by the UNDP. Fukuda-Parr, Director of the
HDR Office at the time, states: ‘With Anand, Sen also played a critical
role in developing the measurement tools of human development, starting
with the Human Development Index’ (2003: 303). This role is claimed for
Sen, despite Sen’s own claim that ‘we cannot reduce all the things we have
reason to value into one homogenous magnitude’ (2009: 239). The UNDP
encouraged Sen, in conjunction with Haq and Anand, to define the list
(Fukuda-Parr, 2003).
The criteria for selecting which capabilities are prioritized as impor-
tant rest, on the one hand, on their being basic and universal: ‘first, they
must be universally valued by people across the world; and second, they
must be basic, meaning their lack would foreclose many other capabilities’
(Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 306). On the other hand capabilities are not basic and
universal in that ‘the human development approach has deliberately
remained open-ended in the choice of capabilities, letting them vary over
time and place’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 306). These criteria are contradictory:
the selected capabilities cannot be both ‘universally valued’ and also vary in
content over time and space.
This ‘flexibility’ can be seen in the changes over time in the indicators
used by the UNDP. In 1990, the focus was on a single figure, the HDI. In
1995, the year of the UN Beijing conference on women, the UNDP intro-
duced two gender indicators: the Gender-related Development Indicator
(GDI), based on gender ratios of the components of the HDI; and the
Gender Empowerment Measurement (GEM), based on gender proportions
in women’s political power (percentage of elected parliamentarians who
were women, and later also percentage of government ministers who were
women) and women’s economic power (percentage of professional and man-
agerial jobs held by women). In later years, further indicators and measure-
ments have been added that include notions of good democratic governance
and human rights.The UNDP declares that these changes in the indicators
are a result of response to political change (Fukuda-Parr, 2003). The
UNDP treats Sen’s ideas as the core principles of a ‘flexible framework’,
which has been applied to diverse and changing policy issues, the emphasis
of which has evolved ‘from the provision of public services to political
empowerment’ (Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 302).
The UNDP indicators, such as the HDI, the GDI and the GEM, are
intended to be focused on outcomes of human development, of achievements
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that in Sen’s paradigm would normally considered functionings rather than
capabilities. The practice over 20 years in the UNDP indicators is to treat
the measurement of capabilities and functionings as if they were the same;
that the measure of functioning is the best available measure of capability.
For example, for the purposes of the HDI, longevity is regarded as a univer-
sal choice or capability, and is best measured in years of life, its achievement
or outcome (Fukuda-Parr, 2003; UNDP, 2009).
How is this alignment between Sen’s capabilities and the UNDP’s out-
come indicators of functioning achieved? The UNDP indicators of human
development are declared to be the best measures of capabilities, opportuni-
ties and choices, on the same grounds as the capabilities were selected ^
that they are ‘universally valued by people across the world’ and are ‘basic’
(Fukuda-Parr, 2003: 306). In effect, capabilities are measured by function-
ings, as in the real world it is obvious that it is not possible to make a dis-
tinction between the two.
The conclusion to be drawn is that the UNDP’s interpretation of Sen’s
framework is so flexible and changing, and the distinction between func-
tionings and capabilities so slight, that the connection between Sen’s ideas
and the indicators used to measure human development becomes tenuous
at best.
Sen and the British EMF
Sen’s work has been declared a key underpinning of the new EMF in
Britain, which is intended to inform a three-yearly review led by the
EHRC (remit Great Britain: England, Wales and Scotland, but not
Northern Ireland) and the GEO evaluating whether there has been progress
towards equality and fairness.
There are two questions here. The first is whether Sen’s capabilities
theory is actually the basis of the EMF or whether other frameworks and
forces are more important. In particular, there is not only the GEO/EHRC
initiative post-2007 to reorient the equalities tradition using the capabilities
framework of Sen, there are also diverse equality traditions linked to the
varied equality strands, the class-led tradition of equality linked to trade
unions and, last but far from least, the institutionalized legal and political
forces of the EU. The second is whether invoking Sen and his concept of
capabilities strengthens the justice agenda or whether his work is deployed
by neoliberal forces to shift the agenda away from equality and towards
choice.
The measurement of equality was previously a matter for the statistics
produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS) and the Treasury’s
Public Service Agreements (PSAs). While indicators and measurement
were not key to the work of the previous equality commissions, which
focused on other matters, nevertheless, a wide array of equality statistics
and indicators have become increasingly available from ONS sources, includ-
ing large-scale surveys (Walby et al., 2008; Walby and Armstrong, 2010).
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Further, the equality agenda was to some extent entrenched in the Treasury’s
PSAs, which constituted a performance measurement mechanism for gov-
ernment departments (HM Treasury, 2007). There was an Equality PSA,
for which the GEO was the lead department, and which contained five
objectives, operationalized by indicators: narrow the gender pay gap;
increase disabled people’s choice and control; address inequalities in civic
participation; tackle discrimination in employment; and improve under-
standing of and ability to address unfair treatment (HM Government,
2009). PSAs were abolished by the incoming Conservative-Liberal
Democrat government in 2010.
From 2007, the EHRC and GEO introduced the work of Sen and his
capabilities approach into the design of the new measurement framework
(the EMF). The EHRC was established in 2007 out of the merger of the
Commission for Racial Equality, the Equal Opportunities Commission,
the Disability Rights Commission and legislation concerning three new
grounds of age, religion/belief and sexual orientation as well as human
rights, and engaged in a wide-ranging review as to the way forward, of
which the EMF is one.The EHRC/GEO commissioned a number of projects
funding a series of pieces of work to develop this approach (Alkire et al.,
2009; Burchardt, 2006; Burchardt and Vizard, 2007; Equalities Review,
2007), but, nevertheless, also funded research that worked with other con-
cepts of equality, such as the socio-economic class-led priorities of the
National Equality Panel (Hills et al., 2010).
Each of the various equality groups or strands has important indepen-
dent traditions, not only in their previous commissions but also in their
civil society organizations and specific legislative victories. For example,
the Commission for Racial Equality had a history of using the concept of
‘good relations’, not only equality; and the Disability Rights Commission a
tradition of emphasizing special needs, not only equality through equal
treatment. The newly institutionalized human rights project has a still dif-
ferent set of preferred concepts related to equality, again with a different
legal encoding. Merging these diverse traditions has entailed increased
diversity in the EMF, and proposals for additional cross-cutting concepts
have been proliferating (for example, on ‘good relations’ see Johnson and
Tatam, 2009).
In the UK, the most powerful and deeply institutionalized equality
tradition has been that produced within trade unions and associated
bodies. Most cases of discrimination (on grounds of sex, ethnicity, disabil-
ity, age, sexual orientation, religion/faith) in employment negotiated with
employers or taken through the courts are supported by trade unions,
while the employment tribunals used to hear cases of discrimination were
originally developed for industrial disputes between employers and workers.
While this equality tradition has been increasingly marginalized from
national deliberative and decision-making processes on equality over the
last 20 years or so, its legacy of deeply entrenched institutions is still
Walby ^ Sen and the Measurement of Justice and Capabilities 109
important in practice. This class-led analysis is echoed in the EHRC/GEO-
funded research of the National Equality Panel (Hills et al., 2010).
The most important part of the equality machinery in the UK con-
tinues to be the legal framework that has been developed in the EU. A
series of equality Directives derives from the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam;
these are legally binding in Member States. It is EU law that there must
be a commission or commissions to promote equality in each Member
State. It is EU Directives that determine the framing of the equality in law
as ‘equal treatment’ and which set minimum standards as to how far this
principle should extend in employment and the sale of goods and services,
and underpin the recent duty on public bodies to promote equality
(European Commission, 2011). The EU has overridden UK preferences on
the strength of equality legislation on several occasions, for example insist-
ing in the mid 1980s that equal pay should not be restricted to the ‘same’
work, but be extended to work of equal value (Hoskyns, 1996; Walby,
1999). The Treaty of Amsterdam extended the grounds for equal treatment
from a short list of gender, ethnicity and disability, to include in addition
sexual orientation, religion and age. The development of UK equality law is
largely, though not entirely, dependent on that developed at the EU level.
The main exception is the UK legislation on racial and ethnic equality,
which preceded the EU developments.
In the UK, as elsewhere, issues in the definition and operationaliza-
tion of equality have been addressed not only in the philosophical literature,
but also in the more practical contexts of equality practitioners. There is a
substantial history of well over 30 years of civil societal, legal and govern-
mental institutional involvement in the contested operationalization of the
concept of equality in legal, governmental, institutional and statistical prac-
tice.The many dilemmas and tensions in the equality agenda have been sub-
ject to democratic process, contestation between rival stakeholders,
interpretation and reinterpretation in law, public debate and compromise.
There is a rich and diverse institutional legacy of equalities work in British
civil society, including trade unions, universities and NGOs. The EHRC/
GEO initiative to reorient the operationalization of the concept of equality
in the UK around Sen’s notion of capabilities is a late intervention in an
already crowded field of competing equality concepts and projects.
In such a context, there is a question as to whether it makes any dif-
ference to practice when the EHRC and GEO announce that Sen’s capabili-
ties are to frame the way equality is measured. This is the issue as to
whether different philosophical approaches to justice make a significant dif-
ference to the measurement of justice in practice. In this instance, the
issue is whether the measurement framework is different when the concept
of capabilities rather than other concepts is used to frame justice. Two of
the most important points at issue are: the selection of the topics that go
beyond income and economic growth; and the selection of the indicators
used to measure them.
110 Theory, Culture & Society 29(1)
The EHRC/GEO selected the key topics for its EMFduring a substan-
tial process involving several stages and documents. The foundational docu-
ment for the EHRC, the Equalities Review (2007), included a list of 10
dimensions.
These ten dimensions form the basis of what we describe as the Equality
Scorecard.We have developed the list that underlies the Scorecard by draw-
ing on international human rights frameworks, and through extensive con-
sultations both with the general public and with some of those individuals
at high risk of experiencing disadvantage. (Equalities Review, 2007: 17)
These are: Longevity; Physical security; Health; Education; Standard
of living; Productive and valued activities; Individual, family and social
life; Participation, influence and voice; Identity, expression and self-respect;
and Legal security. The 10 dimensions are considered to concern ‘freedoms’
and ‘opportunities’ (2007: 18) and to be based on Sen’s capabilities (2007:
125). While considering a range of approaches to the concept of equality,
the Review concludes that: ‘a definition of equality should be based on the
capabilities approach developed by Professor Amartya Sen and others over
the past 30 years’ (2007: 125). However, in practice the Review included a
diverse range of equality perspectives within its several chapters including,
but not only, Sen’s capabilities. The detailed development of the list of 10
capabilities drew on a set of background papers written from the perspec-
tives of Sen’s capabilities and international human rights (Burchardt, 2006;
Burchardt and Vizard, 2007).
Following the selection of the 10 dimensions, the EHRC/GEO moved
on to select the indicators to measure the dimensions. Walby et al. (2008)
conducted a review of equality statistics and indicators, identifying and eval-
uating over 200+ indicators that were either proposed or in use by a wide
range of stakeholders active in the equality field and related academic and
policy research reports and publications. The equality actors included: the
legacy commissions, government departments and their specialized equali-
ties units, HM Treasury and its PSAs, local authority and devolved adminis-
trations, major public services such as the police, major civil society
organizations across the range of equality strands, trade unions, transna-
tional bodies such as the EU and the UN. After consulting with producers
and users of these statistics,Walby et al. (2008) proposed a selection of pri-
ority indicators based on ONS criteria.
Alkire et al. (2009) drew up the final lists of indicators for the EMF,
stating that ‘relatively little research has been devoted to developing criteria
for selecting social indicators to monitor poverty, inequality or well-being’
and thus that ‘a certain amount of innovation is required’ (2009: 25). They
drew on three sources: ‘the theoretical underpinning of the capability
approach developed byAmartya Sen; the international human rights frame-
work; and extensive consultation with the general public, individuals and
groups at risk of discrimination and disadvantage’ (Alkire et al., 2009: 1).
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They identify 48 indicators and 88 measures to cover the 10 dimensions
identified in the Equalities Review (Alkire et al., 2009: xx^xxviii).
What is the influence of Sen on the list of topics and selected indica-
tors? As discussed earlier, Sen does not endorse any specific list of capabili-
ties (2009: 232); neither is it suggested that he specifically endorses the
EHRC/GEO list.Thus it is hard to see what influence Sen had on the selec-
tion of the 10 dimensions of this list.
Although Sen’s philosophical approach depends on a distinction
between capabilities and functionings, with capabilities identified as what
is important, neither the Equalities Review nor Alkire et al. offer indica-
tors and measurements that use the concept of capabilities, instead recom-
mending that outcomes or functionings are to be used as the measure of
capabilities since they are unable to offer a meaningful distinction in prac-
tice. The Equalities Review concedes that it is not possible in practice to
measure capabilities separately from outcomes; hence outcomes must be
treated as if they were the same as capabilities. ‘Measurement of inequality
in outcomes actually attained by individuals or groups in each of the
10 dimensions ^ in many cases this will be a good indicator of whether
people have the real freedom in question’ (Equalities Review, 2007: 130).
Alkire et al. offer distinctions between outcomes (functionings), processes
and autonomy (close to Sen’s concept of capability):
Inequality of outcome ^ that is inequality in the central and valuable things
that individuals actually achieve; inequality of process ^ reflecting inequal-
ities in treatment through discrimination or disadvantage by other individ-
uals and groups, or by institutions and systems, including lack of dignity
and respect. . .. And inequality of autonomy ^ that is, inequality in the
degree of empowerment people have to make decisions affecting their
lives, how much choice and control they really have given their circum-
stances. (2009: 2)
They concede that measures of autonomy (close to capability) are not
available and thus cannot be used. They recommend further research on
this.Thus it is hard to see what influence Sen had on the indicators to mea-
sure the capabilities.
What are the implications of the human rights approach for the defini-
tion of topics and indicators? The list of 10 domains and their sub-fields
has only the most tenuous relationship with the 31 articles of the 1948
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN, 1948). For example, there is
no claim that the treatment of torture as a violation of human rights is a rel-
evant addition to the British EMF. It might be argued that the introduction
of the human rights agenda helps to prioritize the inclusion of otherwise
neglected topics such as care of the disabled. However, disabled groups in
the UK have not usually made their arguments via the discourse of human
rights. The selection of the 10 dimensions of the EMF appears to have little
connection with international human rights.
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What is the impact of the public consultations? Alkire et al. state that
one of the three key inputs into ‘the development of the EMF’ is ‘extensive
consultation with the general public, individuals and groups at risk of dis-
crimination and disadvantage’ (2009: 1). They helpfully provide a list of the
186 attendees at the 12 consultation events and the organizations from
which they came, thus providing clarity as to the nature of the exercise. It
is odd to find that only a minority (28%) of those attending consultation
events were members of civil society strand (and human rights) organiza-
tions, that 45 percent were from government and governmental bodies,
10 percent from public bodies (such as the police), and 16 percent from
civil society non-strand bodies (e.g. universities). There were no trade
unions at the meetings. People from gender equality organizations were pre-
sent at just one-third of the consultation events. The absence of trade
unions and the limited engagement of gender equality groups is surprising.
The consultation events were intra-governmental to a greater extent than
they were consultations with the ‘general public, individuals and groups at
risk of discrimination and disadvantage’.
By contrast, what are the implications of the work of other equality
forces for the topics and indicators selected? In practice, the old legacy com-
missions and governmental policy units addressed most if not all of these
10 dimensions, though the focus had initially been, following the legislation,
on issues of employment and the sale of goods and services, and only
recently extended through mainstreaming the public duty to promote equal-
ity to all policy arenas. The integration of violence (physical and legal secu-
rity) into the remit of the EHRC and equality architecture is a
consequence of civil society pressure (e.g. EVAW, 2011) rather than a philo-
sophically led argument through capabilities or human rights. Violence
against women was included as a human right in 1993 as a consequence of
feminist pressure; that is, human rights adapted in response to feminist
pressure, rather than leading this change. The restructuring of the equality
architecture in Britain has provided an opportunity to reconsider what are
the core policy areas that are relevant to equalities and justice. The answer,
perhaps unsurprisingly, is almost all of them.The equality concept has usu-
ally been more narrowly confined to the economic, largely employment,
but also goods and services, but has increasingly been made more agile so
as to extend across the whole range of major policy domains.This is a conse-
quence of EU strategies of mainstreaming, including the duty placed on
public bodies to promote equality (European Commisison, 2011; Walby,
2005), civil society pressure (e.g. EVAW, 2011) and the broadening of trade
union activities on equality (TUC, 2011). Sen’s approach is not necessary to
the extension of the agenda of the equality architecture, though it is not
inconsistent with this shift.
Thus, during the development of the EHRC/GEO EMF, Sen’s work
was used to justify the centrality of the concept of ‘capability’ to the mea-
surement framework. During the consultation process, some of the bod-
ies traditionally central to the equalities agenda, such as the trade unions,
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were marginalized. However, in practice, the measurement of equality in the
EMF predominantly uses indicators related to outcomes or functionings,
rather than capabilities or choice.
Conclusion
Sen’s work has become an open signifier; a signifier that can be mobilized
behind very different kinds of projects. Despite the emphasis on choice,
Sen’s work was used in the 1990s to support projects that attempted to
insert justice and equality into the goals of global public policy. His work
was used to champion the critique of the neoliberal goal of economic
growth and to offer alternative goals, including longevity, education and
gender equality. However, in the current, more neoliberal period, Sen’s
work is used in attempts to rework justice projects so as to prioritize choice
over equality. Sen’s work is open to a great diversity of readings.
A key philosophical distinction in Sen’s work is that between capabili-
ties and functionings. However, despite their best efforts, neither the
UNDP nor the EHRC has been able to devise a way to measure capabilities
separately from functionings in the real world. Capabilities cannot be mea-
sured separately from functionings, or opportunities from outcomes. In
practice outcomes (functionings) are used to signify and measure capabili-
ties. So, Sen’s philosophical distinction has little direct practical relevance
in the measurement of justice, fairness, equality and progress.
Topics and indicators of equality are a result of politics, expertise and
institutional legacy. Ironically, such flexibility is exactly what Sen wants,
even though others, such as Nussbaum, prefer the list to be derived more
philosophically.The UNDP list changes over time, for example, introducing
gender in 1995, with further changes to indicators being made in 2011
(UNDP 2011). The criteria for the selection of the topics and indicators to
be used in the EMF, which were claimed by the EMF to be influenced by
Sen, human rights and a consultation process (that ignores trade unions),
are in fact informed by a distinctive UK heritage that encompasses a variety
of equality traditions variously embedded in civil society organizations,
trade unions and EU-led law.
Sen has become an iconic figure. His work stands for justice rather
than solely for economic growth. ‘Sen’ (meaning Sen’s work) has become
an ‘open signifier’ in that his work can be and has been interpreted as sup-
porting an extremely wide range of theoretical, policy and political positions.
These diverse positions may be seen as in tension, as contradictory, or as
incoherent. With a focus on choice, his work can be interpreted so that it
fits the agenda of neoliberal forces. With a focus on justice, his work can
be interpreted so that it fits more radical interpretations. Who can catch
him and tie him to their cause? The UNDP brilliantly secured Sen, not
only to support their challenge to the notion of economic growth as the
sole goal of public policy, but also their detailed specification of a very
wide range of justice issues that Sen’s own writings had left entirely open.
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Sen is currently being used to support the justice project of the EHRC and
GEO in the UK; but do not expect to find any of the indicators they say
his approach underpins in any of his many written works.
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